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IP 49.246.17.91 작성일 2017년1월17일 03시36분

Will Trump Attack North Korea?

Doug Bandow
January 10, 2017

In his New Year’s Day address, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un said his nation was close to testing an ICBM which could hit the United States. Put a nuclear warhead on top and the North will have developed an effective deterrent against the global superpower.
Predictably, President-elect Donald Trump responded via tweet: “It won’t happen.”

Which means precisely what? He doesn’t believe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be able to develop such a missile or miniaturize such a weapon? That’s unlikely, since Pyongyang’s weapons programs have developed further and faster than had been predicted. American officials might hope for technical difficulties, but it would be foolish to make hope the basis of U.S. policy toward the North.

Maybe the president-elect means, well, nothing. Going back to George H.W. Bush, every U.S. president has insisted that North Korea would not develop nuclear weapons. But it has. Last September, Kim’s regime staged the DPRK’s fifth nuclear test. Trump’s exclamation might be similar empty bombast. Many of his tweets seem likely to fall into this category.

Another possibility is that Trump expects to talk the latest scion of the de facto monarchy into abandoning the dynasty’s geopolitical ambitions. Indeed, during the campaign, The Donald indicated his interest in meeting Kim. But very few Korea watchers believe Pyongyang is prepared to voluntarily cede its nuclear program, irrespective of benefits offered. Trump might be impressed with his own negotiating skills, but he hasn’t been up against the Kim clan before.

The president-elect might plan to follow up his recent tweet by insisting that Beijing pressure the North to stop the latter’s weapons programs. However, China’s influence is limited. More importantly, Beijing is not interested in imposing regime change for America’ benefit, especially since a cut-off of food and energy could result in a messy implosion on China’s border, as well as a unified Korea allied with the United States. So far Beijing prefers the prospect of a nuclear North as a lesser evil.

Finally, perhaps Trump, who during the campaign accused Hillary Clinton of being too ready to go to war, plans to attack North Korea. Or at least commit an act of war by destroying test facilities or downing test missiles. That might work. But it also might trigger retaliation and a much larger war.

In early January, the Wall Street Journal urged the Obama administration to shoot down any North Korean missile. That’s not a new idea. A decade ago Ashton Carter, then merely a former assistant secretary of defense, along with his former boss, Defense Secretary William Perry, advocated that the United States “immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean [long-range] Taepodong missile before it can be launched.” They acknowledged the potential for war, but thought North Korea unlikely to risk conflict. Alas, today the North has additional options for more limited but still deadly responses.

No one would deny the U.S. the right, indeed, obligation, to destroy any missiles that were about to be launched at America. But even the Heritage Foundation’s Bruce Klingner warned against taking military action for anything less: “A U.S. military attack against production or test facilities of North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs could trigger an all-out war with a nuclear-armed state that likely already has the ability to target South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons, and has a million-man army poised across the DMZ from South Korea.”

Having successfully defended against the resumption of the Korean War over the last 63 years, Washington should not risk triggering another devastating round. Although the DPRK would lose, the carnage could be enormous, especially in South Korea’s capital, Seoul, which lies close to the border.

So what to do? Trump sounds like he has set one of those infamous “red lines,” but, like his predecessor, has set himself up for an embarrassing climb-down when reality inevitably intrudes.

Obviously, developments in the North are unsettling, to say the least. For a small, poor and isolated nation, the DPRK’s weapons development has proved to be surprisingly robust. Its conventional forces are known more for quantity than quality. However, with estimates that even now it may possess sufficient nuclear materials for up to twenty weapons, and could have fifty to one hundred warheads by 2020, the DPRK threatens to emerge alongside India, Israel and Pakistan as a serious nuclear power.

Pyongyang’s existing missile capabilities place much of northeast Asia within reach. The Kim regime conducted more than twenty missile tests last year, including of a submarine-launched ballistic missile, which would extend North Korea’s capabilities. But a flight test for an ICBM would be a first. A working ICBM would put the continental United States within range, though how soon the North could miniaturize warheads and improve accuracy still is unknown. No other small state would have acquired its own nuclear deterrent against the world’s most powerful nation.

The bad news about these developments is obvious enough. The North has made unpredictability the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and the Kim dynasty is not squeamish about bloodletting. Kim’s grandfather started the Korean War. Kim’s father presided over mass famine which killed perhaps a half million or more people. Kim remains relatively untested and has ruled brutally, executing upwards of 130 top apparatchiks.

Yet there is good news, surprisingly enough. All of the Kims, including the current ruler, appear to be ruthlessly pragmatic, determined to enjoy their virgins in this world, not the next. The North Korean bomb is not a suicide weapon. Rather, it fulfills several important roles: defense against the globe’s superpower, which leans toward promiscuous regime change; sign of status, which allows an otherwise irrelevant impoverished land to dominate global headlines; tool of extortion, encouraging frightened neighbors to provide cash and aid; and domestic political prop, aimed at preserving the military’s loyalty.

To the extent that Kim’s public pronouncements matter, in his New Year’s address he talked about “making nuclear weapons a cornerstone” policy so long as the United States and Republic of Korea continue “nuclear threats,” “blackmail,” and “war exercises.” This is pretty standard DPRK boilerplate, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t a kernel of truth. Henry Kissinger is reputed to have observed that even paranoids have enemies, and that certainly is the case for the North. After being tagged as a member of the Axis of Evil by the U.S. president who made his name (and ruined his reputation) by initiating regime change against a second Axis member, Pyongyang would be foolish not prepare against attack. Equally dubious would be relying on any American promises after the Obama administration helped oust the Libyan government which had negotiated away its nascent missile and nuclear capabilities.

All told, the DPRK is extremely unlikely to initiate an attack on America. What would it gain? Almost instant destruction. How would that benefit Kim & Co.? Pretty hard to imagine. So as long as Washington doesn’t start bombing the North, nothing much is likely to happen.

That doesn’t mean the situation is not dangerous. But almost the entire danger to America reflects the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea. Were American troops not present, backing up Washington’s promise to go to war on the ROK’s behalf, Kim would have no reason to pay much notice to America. Kim doesn’t spend a lot of time threatening to turn London, Paris and Berlin into lakes of fire. He has announced no plan for incinerating Indian, Kenyan and Indonesian cities. Washington matters because it has inserted itself into the middle of the messy Korean imbroglio.

So what should the Trump administration do?

Get out of Korea.

The United States is at risk because it has placed itself squarely within the Korean imbroglio. The South’s advantages are overwhelming—about forty times the GDP, a massive technological edge, overwhelming international support, including friendly relation with former DPRK allies China and Russia, and twice the population. There’s no need for American conventional forces to be stationed in or around the Korean Peninsula. Washington should phase out its military presence and end its security guarantee.

In the short-term, the United States should maintain its nuclear umbrella over the ROK. But over time Washington should consider other options, including the possibility of South Korea and Japan developing countervailing nuclear deterrents. That prospect might encourage Beijing to place more pressure on the North to happily short-circuit the entire process. In any case, the United States could decide to maintain its guarantee against a North Korean nuclear attack without maintaining any conventional forces in the peninsula.

An American withdrawal would have several advantages: remove Washington from the center of any Korean conflict, turn responsibility for the South’s defense over to Seoul, eliminate Washington’s role as the DPRK’s enemy number one, reduce perceived security threats against Pyongyang and shift responsibility for lowering regional tensions to countries in the region. The United States still would have interests at stake, but they would remain secondary to those of North Korea’s neighbors.

Having gotten out of Korea, the Trump administration would have more options in addressing the North: engagement over issues short of denuclearization and with limited expectations would make sense. Washington also would be better able to make a deal with China to pressure the North, having demonstrated that the United States would not attempt to use a reunited Korea as part of a campaign to contain China. And leaving the Asian mainland would give credence to America’s threat to back its allies’ potential quest for nuclear weapons, thereby building a Pacific nuclear shield against China and Russia as well as the DPRK.

North Korea remains the perpetual problem with no good solutions. It is the famed land of bad options. But rather than paint his administration into a corner, the president-elect could begin to put distance between America and the incipient crisis. That might not make the problems any easier to solve, but no longer would Washington be stuck with chief responsibility for dealing with the DPRK.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/will-trump-attack-north-korea-19010?page=2

[2/3] 먹고사니즘

IP 218.49.230.254 작성일 2017년1월17일 07시05분

주무실 시간에 주무시지 못하고
이렇게 소중히 참고해야 할 문건을 밝혀주시니
한편 마음이 아리면서도 감사하다는 인사만 전합니다..

본 문건을 해석문 보다
영문으로 보자니 이해가 빠르군요..
천지님께 한번 웃어 보자고 한 넝담 입니다~*^^*

언제적 부터 양키들이
이북의 icbm에 대한
큰 관심을 쏟았는지는 잘 모르겠으나
그 이북제 icbm을
과소평가로 맛싸지를 하면서도
매우 위험하다고 "주일한 양키군 철수"에 대한
이유를 본 문건에서 설명하고 있네요..

평화를 구걸하지 않는 이북에서는 전세계를 향하여
더욱더 가열차게 핵감축을 주장해 나서고 있습죵~

그 의미는 지구촌에서 미제양키 날강도들의 소행머리를
더이상 묵인하지 않겠다는 지구행성의 참주인된 모습이며
강위력한 무장력으로 "날강도 미제양키 주범과 추종국 종범들까지"
단숨에 한방으로 조자바리 내시겠다는 이북의 엄중한 태세라고 봅니다..

그래서 밑자락 깔린 얄포롬한 위 본문의 뜻을 받아
막다른 양키 도람푸는 인질화된 주일한 양키군 철수를
이북에 허락받아야 할 처지에 놓여 있으며
또한 강제된 조미평화협정체결을 빠른 시일내
세계만방에 공표하고 이행 시켜야 한다는 정세로 보여집니다..

한마디로 말해서~
미제양키의 영양까 있는 시간은 끝장 났으며
주춤거릴수록 한파에 얼어 뒈지는 노숙자 신세로 전락 되는 막장상황 이라는..

그 이후 보여지는 주동적인 조선반도의 상황은
우리민족이 승리적으로 상상해야 하기 때문에 이만 쭐~??

천지님께서 주신 소중히 참고 할 자료를 보면서
졸필이지만 짧게 감상문을 적어 봅니다..

천지님 내내 무탈하시고 강령하세요~*^^*

[3/3] 단순한 생각..

IP 58.87.60.230 작성일 2017년1월17일 08시41분

트럼프가 한반도에서 미군이 철수하게 될 경우,
중. 러의 태평양 진출을 견재할 핵심 거점이 사라지고..
일본이 유일한 방어선으로 남게 되죠.

태평양은 미국의 경제패권에 있어서 마지지막 숨통이고..
태평양 패권이 무너지면 미국경제는 파산되고..
미국 연방정부도 공중분해 될수밖에 없을겁니다.

그런데 북한 또한 과연 주한미군 철수로 만족할까요?..
천만에 말씀 만만에 콩떡 일겁니다.

미국의 대북적대시정책 패기가 북한의 궁극적인 목표인데..
미군의 항모. 핵잠. 탄도탄. 공군. 해군.기지들이 산재한 일본을..
절대로 용납하지 않으려 할것은 불보듯 뻔한 이치죠.

결국 일본 주위에 배치된 주일미군은..
북.중.러의 집중포화를 받을수밖에 없는거고..
한국의 동족이라는 프리미엄도 없을뿐더러..
역사적인 원한까지 있는 일본에선 속수무책..
방을 뺄수밖에 없는게 미국의 처지죠.

미국에겐 결국..
주한미군이 마지막 보루 인 셈..^^.

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